Abstract
The deterrence debate cannot be separated from the theoretical framework of interstate relations that govern states actions. The deterrence in the India – Pakistan context is not an exception to this discussion. This paper attempts to reassess the existing contours of nuclear deterrence debate within the context of larger theoretical framework and how after nearly two decades of nuclearization the assumptions underpinning these contours are valid and relevant to the changed geopolitical landscape.
States can strive to ensure their preservation either through internal balancing (increasing economic and military strength) or external balancing (creating alliances) in relation to other states. Keneth Waltz introduced the distinction between bandwagoning and balancing, where the former refers to a state joining a stronger state, while the latter refers to a state joining few other states to balance against a more powerful state1. Changes in the international system therefore depend upon the structure and composition of the powerful states, and more precisely upon the relative capacity of the state concerned.