Vol. 14 No. 1 (2026): Journal of Strategic Studies, Summer 2026
Articles

Exploring Potential Models and Trajectories for Future Arms Control Architecture in a Multipolar World

Sufian Ullah
Sufian Ullah (PhD) is the Director of the Maritime Centre of Excellence at Pakistan Navy War College, Lahore.
Published June 30, 2026
How to Cite
Sufian Ullah. (2026). Exploring Potential Models and Trajectories for Future Arms Control Architecture in a Multipolar World. CISS Insight Journal, 14(1). Retrieved from https://journal.ciss.org.pk/index.php/ciss-insight/article/view/446

Abstract

With the demise of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), the international security environment has entered a new stage in which nuclear powers are engaged in unrestrained strategic competition without the discipline of legally binding arms control agreements-an unprecedented situation since the beginning of the nuclear age. This development occurs in the backdrop of the gradual transformation of the global strategic environment towards a predominantly complex multipolar structure that entails multiple strategic competitors with intensifying geopolitical rivalries, along with rapid advancements in disruptive technologies intersecting with nuclear deterrence. This paper offers an analytical assessment of the impact of these changes on future arms control architecture. It examines the transition of the international security environment towards a multipolar order and shows how it differs from the past. It analyses the relevance of arms control as a policy option in a complex multipolar structure and identifies the underlying rationale behind arms control remaining the same. However, the new objectives must incorporate contemporary challenges arising from multi-actor deterrence dynamics, rapid technological advancements, and interconnectedness between nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities. The article further explores potential models for future arms control architecture by examining the prospects and limitations of trilateral, bilateral, and unilateral approaches. The paper particularly focuses on the United States’ (US) view of China as a potential nuclear peer whose advancing capabilities shape the former’s threat perception as well as arms control choices, especially in the context of Beijing and Moscow. The paper argues that despite the challenges confronting the prospects of legally binding arms control measures between great powers, the prevailing instabilities in the contemporary security environment necessitate exploring flexible, specific, and modular arms control measures which could enhance transparency and predictability.