Eroding Multilateral Architecture and Nuclear Non-proliferation Regime

Abstract

The multilateral nuclear non-proliferation architecture, built over six decades through treaties, verification mechanisms, and diplomatic forums, is witnessing its most severe test. This article examines how the erosion of multilateral institutions and agreements affects the long-term viability of the non-proliferation regime. This paper analyzes the growing stress on nuclear non-proliferation norms, legitimacy, compliance incentives, safeguards credibility, and disarmament obligations. It further argues that the multilateral architecture is fading not because of external challenges but due to internal contradictions, including selective enforcement, unfulfilled bargains, and the substitution of exclusive arrangements for universal norms. The nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) Review Conference (RevCon) and the Conference on Disarmament (CD) are ineffective; arms control agreements have been dismantled without successors; safeguards standards have been applied selectively; and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has failed as an enforcement mechanism. These dynamics are reshaping the cost-benefit calculus that sustained nuclear restraint for the majority of states. The article explores three future trajectories, i.e., managed decline, institutional fragmentation, and renewed multilateralism. The article further identifies the conditions under which the architecture might be revived, including non-discriminatory criteria for export control membership, universal safeguards application, and recommitment to the foundational principles of undiminished security for all states.