Managed Stability to Competitive Deterrence: Structural Transformation of Nuclear Order and Strategic Stability of South Asia

Abstract

The nuclear order that emerged during the Cold War is undergoing a structural transformation. For decades, international security operated under a framework of managed nuclear stability, characterized by predictable deterrence relationships supported by arms control regimes, verification mechanisms, and tacit norms of restraint. Despite their limitations, the structured arrangements collectively reduced the probability of misperception and inadvertent escalation of conflict. During this period, second-strike survivability was robustly maintained, and offensive and defensive nuclear postures remained distinguishable to the degree necessary for rational deterrence calculations. The decision timelines under crisis were sufficient to support deliberative decision-making processes. This article posits that the emergence of multipolarity, the collapse of bilateral arms control between the United States (US) and Russia, and technological disruption have produced a distinct strategic environment, termed ‘competitive deterrence,’ which has severely impacted second-strike survivability, distinguishability of force postures, and deliberative decision timelines. This article uses South Asia as a case study to examine competitive deterrence dynamics in their most direct form. South Asia is a nuclear flashpoint due to recurring crises and the absence of a dialogue process between India and Pakistan. India’s build-up of destabilizing strategic capabilities, growing conventional asymmetries, and doctrinal modifications to seek space for war below the nuclear threshold constitute a critical case for testing competitive deterrence dynamics.