Abstract
The nuclear explosion code-named ‘Smiling Buddha’ conducted on 18th of May 1974 by India had a decisive impact on both regional and international strategic environments leading to increased concerns over nuclear weapons proliferation. The most prominent step taken by the international community to address these concerns was to co-ordinate export rules and mechanisms of the individual supplier states. The aim was to standardize their behavior regarding the nuclear trade so as to curb future instances like that of India. Since it was aimed at regulating the exports of nuclear technology, it is one of the export control regimes which are a part of the nonproliferation regime as a whole.
This group of nuclear supplier states took a formal shape after becoming more integrated, and came to be known as the Nuclear Suppliers Group. NSG is basically a cartel comprising of nuclear supplier states and shaped against the perspective of nuclear proliferation. It has therefore maintained its support for the non-proliferation regime. To date all developments and changes in the NSG have bolstered its status as a non-proliferation mechanism and have had a direct bearing on global efforts towards non-proliferation. However, current initiatives by certain states pose grave challenges to the structure and function of NSG and might result in changes which could have farreaching consequences for NSG’s existence as an export regulation mechanism and as well as for the attainment of broader non-proliferation objectives.1 Therefore, this push towards change, the probable outcomes in their final shape and the ways in which these would impact the future of NSG in its regional and international connections is the basic concern that forms the subject of the present paper.