

Book Review
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Abdul Sattar, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy 1947-2016 - A Concise History*. (Oxford University Press, 2016), 392

Pakistan's Foreign Policy 1947-2016 - A Concise History is the fourth edition of the book written by Abdul Sattar, published originally in 2007, outlining the foreign policy choices made by Pakistan since its inception to 2016. The book includes a foreword by late Agha Shahi, who was twice Foreign Minister of Pakistan, once from July to October 1993 and again from 1977 to 1982, and was also Foreign Secretary from 1973 to 1977. This latest edition of the book includes an updated view of Pakistan's foreign policy since 2012. Given his experience as a foreign policy practitioner, as well as having served as Pakistan's High Commissioner to India from 1978-1982 and again from 1990-1992, the book has a great deal of credibility. Information in the book draws from not only references from other published sources but the author's own professional perception of foreign policy issues while he was in service.

The book begins with a brief introduction to the history of the independence of the sub-continent from British rule, which led to the creation of Pakistan and an account of its early relations with neighbours and big powers. This is encapsulated within two chapters. In the subsequent chapter, the author discusses the Kashmir issue, which materialized as soon as Pakistan and India came into being; the two neighbours came to blows over the disputed territory of the state of Jammu and Kashmir in 1947 and fought two wars subsequently. The initial armed conflict ended in January 1949 but resulted in no resolution and consequently came to shape much of the resentment and mistrust between the two states for the years to come.

The next two chapters explore Pakistan's quest to form alliances with powers around the world in the wake of a hostile relationship with India. India had, in the beginning, hoped that Pakistan will not survive as an independent state and had created problems to realize this notion. It did not transfer Pakistan's share of resources as per agreement at partition and Indian leaders made bellicose statements against the creation of Pakistan. The All-India Congress leader Mahatma Gandhi had declared shortly before the 3rd June Plan that "Even if the whole of India burns, we shall not concede Pakistan", and "So long as I am alive, I will never agree to the Partition of India." This instilled in Pakistan a fear of Indian designs against it. Secondly, non-resolution of Kashmir and failure to reach a consensus to reach on an agreement for a mechanism to ascertain a sure future of the state further exacerbated Pakistan's threat perceptions vis-à-vis its bigger neighbor.

The book then proceeds to discuss Pakistan's relations with important international players over the decades. During the 1950s, formation of formal alliances with other countries was a foreign policy priority for Pakistan. Pakistan became part of four alliances, two with the US and two with Middle Eastern and South East Asian countries under the US umbrella. However, in the 1960s, the futility of these alliances for Pakistan started coming to the fore. Several developments were indicative of this realization. First, during the 1950s decade, it had been clear from US' conduct that it was more interested in having India as an ally rather than Pakistan, a smaller power in comparison. Therefore, in 1960, when the Sino-Soviet association started disintegrating, and China and India fought their first war in 1962, US took advantage of the opportunity to forge ties with India in order to strengthen it against China, an emerging power in Asia. Then, when the US failed to come to Pakistan's aid in the 1965 war with India, Pakistan was pushed to seek out USSR's friendship in 1966 and strengthen its relationship with China. As a consequence, Pakistan-US relations became rather bitter, with the then US President Johnson telling President Ayub

Khan in 1966 that the alliance between the two countries was over in 1966. Relations with the US did not improve until the coming of Richard Nixon to the office of US President in 1969.

The author describes the turbulent 1970s decade in three chapters. The progress made by Pakistan with the USSR was undone in 1970-1971 because Pakistan helped the US reach a rapprochement with China. The author also discusses the 1971 War with India, which led to the fall of Dhaka and the creation of Bangladesh. In the 70s, the Shimla Agreement also took place, which seemed to be doomed to failure right until the very end, when the two countries agreed upon maintaining calm at the Line of Control. Following the 1971 debacle, however, the Pakistani leader Zulfikar Bhutto started a quest for attaining nuclear weapons capability, which he deemed was crucial to the security of the state given that the US had failed to come to Pakistan's rescue in all its wars with India.

The thinking in Pakistani political circles about going nuclear further distanced Pakistan from the US during the 70s. The only brief silver lining in the 70s decade was the bettering of relations with India during BJP's government in 1977-1979, which is discussed in a separate chapter. Meanwhile, another problem had begun to materialize on Pakistan's Western side in the mid-1970s. Soviet intervention in Afghanistan's internal politics led Afghan leadership to forge ties with Pakistan, angering USSR which, in turn, ignited communist uprisings in Afghanistan. Geo-political considerations drove Pakistan to fight against USSR alongside Afghans, with the support of US and Saudi Arabia and the West. Pakistan's stature abroad however improved after 1979 when Pakistan became part of the war against Soviet forces, and throughout the 1980s until the end of the decade, only to fall into another negative pattern starting in the 1990s. The US-Pakistan relations suffered again, as the US shifted its attention from Afghanistan to the Eastern Europe.

The 1970s and 80s were also rife with uprisings in Kashmir. The rise of Taliban in 1994 in Afghanistan's domestic politics plus Pakistan's support for them put Pakistan at odds with the West and was further exacerbated by Pakistan's nuclear program gaining strength. Because of these factors, the idea of Islam was stigmatized and gained a negative connotation in the West. Hence, during the 1990s, Pakistan's relations with the international community became strained again presenting multiple foreign policy challenges. The author poses some hard questions regarding Pakistan's Afghan policy, such as whether Pakistan's policy was misconceived and the spillover effects of the support to Afghans, such as the Kalashnikov culture and narcotics proliferation could have been mitigated. He opines that such decisions and consequences, due to lack of foresight and prioritization, could have been averted.

Pakistan's stance on arms control matters also emerged in the 1990s. It ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention, but did not consent to ratify CTBT until India did, and did not agree with the provisions given in the FMCT, stating that the draft did not address the issue of existing stockpiles of fissile material. In 1998, Pakistan conducted nuclear tests, taking lead from India. Following its tests, Pakistan declared a unilateral moratorium on further testing, developed a command and control structure of the state's nuclear weapons, and formulated a "minimum credible deterrence" doctrine for its nuclear strategy.

The events of September 11, 2001 unfolded just under three years after Pakistan went nuclear. Given the involvement of Al Qaeda in the attacks, the identity of Islam gained an even more pejorative nuance, and this complicated Pakistan's foreign relations even further, providing an opportunity to India to strengthen its relations with the US. This made relations between Pakistan and US mutually distrustful. However, Pakistan's decision to support the

US-led Global War on Terror made Pakistan relevant to the US again.

A separate chapter is dedicated to the issue of terrorism, wherein the author has narrated the origins of terrorism in Pakistan. He underscores that terrorism did not originate in Pakistan, but found grounds here in the wake of Pakistan's participation in the War on Terror which was not of Pakistan's making. He goes on to discuss the social, political and economic human cost that the country had to pay for being part of War on Terror.

Four chapters toward the end of the book are dedicated to Pakistan's relations with the US, Afghanistan, India and China from 2001 to 2016. The author explores briefly differences with the US and India as well as Afghanistan. The interests of the three increasingly converged after 2001, sidelining Pakistan. More crises erupted on the Kashmir front, while terrorism in Afghanistan made matters worse in Pakistan as well as its relations with US. Meanwhile, Pakistan forged better strategic and diplomatic relations with China, a relationship that had endured the test of time. The author holds that 9/11 was the final turning point in Pakistan's foreign policy history, where its involvement in the War on Terror caused more costs than benefits.

The book's layout is quite simple, with plain language and an easy-to-understand arrangement. The discussion of the foreign policy history of Pakistan is carried out in a chronological order as well as in a topical manner. The advantage of a issue-wise discussion is the ease with which the reader can locate and consult a specific era or topic. But on the downside, upon a reading of the book, the chapters sometimes end rather abruptly. Sometimes, repetition and overlap of eras and subjects occurs in multiple chapters. This was perhaps unavoidable as decisions are hardly made linearly and in vacuum, and multiple factors affecting the course of relations govern choices. The final chapter of the book is analytical, and has

addressed in some detail the foreign policy choices of Pakistan and the broad contours that drove them, to round off the book nicely.

It, however, lacks an overarching framework of discussion as the author discusses a wide range of issues in all the chapters that do not conform to a homogeneous agenda. The book also lacks a more detailed discussion on the how and whys of nuclear matters and policies. The discussion on Pakistan's account of nuclear strategy is rather brief and only very basic. A discussion of legal and conceptual considerations that drove the adoption of Pakistan's nuclear policy is missing from the author's discussion.

The book includes five appendices: The Shimla Agreement, 1972, Composite Dialogue 1997-1998, The Lahore Declaration, 21 February 1999, The Agra Declaration, 2001 Draft Agreement, and a list of Presidents, Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers of Pakistan. It would have been useful if the author had also included the official drafts of the position taken by Pakistan on nuclear arms-related issues, such as FMCT and CTBT, two of the most important issues in the Conference on Disarmament as well as the many regional arms-control and disarmament proposals that Pakistan gave since the 1970s.

Pakistan's Foreign Policy 1947-2016 - A Concise History, is a useful book. Given its arrangement, it is best suited for students of Pakistan's history and international relations. It is therefore an essential read for anyone looking to get acquainted with Pakistan's foreign policy history. For scholars, it serves as a reliable source of the official and authentic account of Pakistan's foreign relations since 1947.

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