CISS Insight Journal

Managed Stability to Competitive Deterrence

Aqeel Akhtar — 2026-06-30

The nuclear order that emerged during the Cold War is undergoing a structural transformation. For decades, international security operated under a framework of managed nuclear stability, characterized by predictable deterrence relationships supported by arms control regimes, verification mechanisms, and tacit norms of restraint. Despite their limitations, the structured arrangements collectively reduced the probability of misperception and inadvertent escalation of conflict. During this period, second-strike survivability was robustly maintained, and offensive and defensive nuclear postures remained distinguishable to the degree necessary for rational deterrence calculations. The decision timelines under crisis were sufficient to support deliberative decision-making processes. This article posits that the emergence of multipolarity, the collapse of bilateral arms control between the United States (US) and Russia, and technological disruption have produced a distinct strategic environment, termed ‘competitive deterrence,’ which has severely impacted second-strike survivability, distinguishability of force postures, and deliberative decision timelines. This article uses South Asia as a case study to examine competitive deterrence dynamics in their most direct form. South Asia is a nuclear flashpoint due to recurring crises and the absence of a dialogue process between India and Pakistan. India’s build-up of destabilizing strategic capabilities, growing conventional asymmetries, and doctrinal modifications to seek space for war below the nuclear threshold constitute a critical case for testing competitive deterrence dynamics.

Eroding Multilateral Architecture and Nuclear Non-proliferation Regime

Husham Ahmed — 2026-06-30

The multilateral nuclear non-proliferation architecture, built over six decades through treaties, verification mechanisms, and diplomatic forums, is witnessing its most severe test. This article examines how the erosion of multilateral institutions and agreements affects the long-term viability of the non-proliferation regime. This paper analyzes the growing stress on nuclear non-proliferation norms, legitimacy, compliance incentives, safeguards credibility, and disarmament obligations. It further argues that the multilateral architecture is fading not because of external challenges but due to internal contradictions, including selective enforcement, unfulfilled bargains, and the substitution of exclusive arrangements for universal norms. The nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) Review Conference (RevCon) and the Conference on Disarmament (CD) are ineffective; arms control agreements have been dismantled without successors; safeguards standards have been applied selectively; and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has failed as an enforcement mechanism. These dynamics are reshaping the cost-benefit calculus that sustained nuclear restraint for the majority of states. The article explores three future trajectories, i.e., managed decline, institutional fragmentation, and renewed multilateralism. The article further identifies the conditions under which the architecture might be revived, including non-discriminatory criteria for export control membership, universal safeguards application, and recommitment to the foundational principles of undiminished security for all states.

Impact of Global Arms Control Crisis on Arms Restraint in South Asia

Nasir Mehmood — 2026-06-30

The global arms control framework has eroded significantly, as landmark treaties have collapsed under intensifying great-power competition. This erosion has directly impacted South Asia, where the normative standards that once encouraged strategic restraint have considerably weakened. While India and Pakistan have never concluded formal bilateral arms control agreements, global arms control initiatives have historically established norms that indirectly shaped regional strategic behavior. India’s persistent reluctance to engage in regional arms control initiatives has been the principal driver of declining strategic stability in South Asia. New Delhi has consistently resisted bilateral confidence-building measures (CBMs) and nuclear risk-reduction arrangements, foreclosing the possibility of a negotiated regional security architecture. In contrast, Pakistan has demonstrated consistent restraint by maintaining a policy of credible minimum deterrence (CMD) without engaging in destabilizing arms racing behavior. Meanwhile, India has pursued rapid and accelerating military modernization across both nuclear and conventional domains, dramatically widening the asymmetry between the two states. The operationalization of sea-based deterrents, the development of advanced delivery systems, and the acquisition of precision conventional capabilities have compounded Pakistan’s security challenges. The absence of any arms control framework to manage these developments poses a growing threat to strategic stability in South Asia, increasing risks of miscalculation and inadvertent escalation. Against this backdrop, the paper examines the impact of the global arms control crisis on arms restraint in South Asia and offers practical policy recommendations for policymakers and stakeholders that can be adopted by both states to establish restraint mechanisms, ultimately ensuring regional strategic stability.

Iran’s Nuclear Program

Ghazala Yasmin Jalil — 2026-06-30

The crisis surrounding Iran’s nuclear program has increasingly shifted from diplomatic management towards military confrontation, raising critical questions about the durability of negotiated nuclear restraint arrangements. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) represented one of the most comprehensive diplomatic efforts to address concerns regarding Iran’s nuclear activities through limits on its enrichment activities and reciprocal sanctions relief. However, the unilateral withdrawal of the United States (US) from the agreement in 2018, followed by the reimposition of extensive economic sanctions, fundamentally complicated the Iranian nuclear dispute. This decision undermined the credibility of multilateral diplomacy, eroded confidence in negotiated commitments, and generated a deep trust deficit between Iran and Western powers. Against this backdrop, tensions surrounding Iran’s nuclear program have increasingly been managed through coercive pressure and the use of force, as evidenced by the twelve-day US-Israel war on Iran in June 2025, as well as the recent war of 2026. The collapse of the JCPOA framework has, therefore, transformed a previously negotiated nuclear issue into a broader strategic crisis with significant implications for regional security and global nuclear non-proliferation efforts. This article argues that the erosion of diplomatic mechanisms designed to manage Iran’s nuclear program risks reinforcing perceptions within Iran that nuclear restraint does not guarantee security or protection from external pressure. Under conditions of sustained confrontation and strategic uncertainty, debates within Iran regarding the costs and benefits of continued adherence to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) may intensify. The article examines whether the breakdown of the JCPOA and the military strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities could ultimately incentivize Tehran to reconsider its nuclear posture and develop deterrence capabilities as a means of ensuring regime survival. This could lead to a domino effect of nuclear proliferation in the region and across the globe, further undermining the NPT. The study highlights how the failure of diplomacy in favor of the use of military force can reshape proliferation incentives and complicate efforts to manage nuclear risks in an increasingly fragmented global nuclear order.

Fragmented Global Nuclear Order

Rizwan Zeb — 2026-06-30

The expiry of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) effectively ended the traditional global nuclear order. This fragmentation of the nuclear order is marked by new challenges in the form of artificial intelligence (AI), cyber capabilities, and autonomous systems in the global and regional nuclear landscape. The South Asian nuclear dyad is a prime example of this complexity as a region with a poor record of nuclear risk reduction and confidence-building measures (CBMs). Since 2014, India has been ruled by a Hindutva-motivated Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led regime that seems to demonstrate a tendency to use war and nuclear weapons to achieve political ends, posing a grave threat to Pakistan’s national security. This paper aims to understand the history and historicity of the global nuclear order, thereby situating the South Asian nuclear dyad within it. It explores how India and Pakistan developed certain risk reduction measures and CBMs. The paper also addresses how the regime led by Narendra Modi is inclined to risk-taking behavior, which adversely affects strategic stability between India and Pakistan and the challenges posed by the emerging technologies, AI, and enhanced cyber capabilities have complicated the already troubled strategic stability in the region. The paper concludes by highlighting the need for a peace oriented partnership between India and Pakistan on regional strategic stability.

Exploring Potential Models and Trajectories for Future Arms Control Architecture in a Multipolar World

Sufian Ullah — 2026-06-30

With the demise of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), the international security environment has entered a new stage in which nuclear powers are engaged in unrestrained strategic competition without the discipline of legally binding arms control agreements-an unprecedented situation since the beginning of the nuclear age. This development occurs in the backdrop of the gradual transformation of the global strategic environment towards a predominantly complex multipolar structure that entails multiple strategic competitors with intensifying geopolitical rivalries, along with rapid advancements in disruptive technologies intersecting with nuclear deterrence. This paper offers an analytical assessment of the impact of these changes on future arms control architecture. It examines the transition of the international security environment towards a multipolar order and shows how it differs from the past. It analyses the relevance of arms control as a policy option in a complex multipolar structure and identifies the underlying rationale behind arms control remaining the same. However, the new objectives must incorporate contemporary challenges arising from multi-actor deterrence dynamics, rapid technological advancements, and interconnectedness between nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities. The article further explores potential models for future arms control architecture by examining the prospects and limitations of trilateral, bilateral, and unilateral approaches. The paper particularly focuses on the United States’ (US) view of China as a potential nuclear peer whose advancing capabilities shape the former’s threat perception as well as arms control choices, especially in the context of Beijing and Moscow. The paper argues that despite the challenges confronting the prospects of legally binding arms control measures between great powers, the prevailing instabilities in the contemporary security environment necessitate exploring flexible, specific, and modular arms control measures which could enhance transparency and predictability.