Abstract
NEARLY eight years ago, the then US president, George W. Bush, and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh announced their intention to draw up a civil nuclear cooperation agreement.
President Bush stated on the occasion that “as a responsible state with advanced nuclear technology, India should acquire the same benefits and advantages as other such states”. In initiating the deal, Bush ignored an overwhelming number of weighty factors that militated against it. Critics raised the following objections:
1) In open violation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the bilateral deal would make it impossible to advocate nonproliferation for others.
2) Secondly, two other non-NPT states, Pakistan and Israel, would also seek similar exceptions which, if granted, would further weaken the treaty.
3) By granting Indian demands for transfers to enrich and reprocess spent fuel under safeguards, it would make it harder to stop national enrichment and reprocessing programs elsewhere.
4) By obtaining abundant fuel supplies from outside, India might find it easier to resume nuclear testing.